Benefit Analysis of Closed-loop Supply Chain
under Remanufacturing Condition

LI Xinjun^{1, 2}  DA Qingli²

(1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Yantai University, Yantai 264005;
2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189)

Abstract: In view of a secondary closed-loop supply chain system composed of one manufacturer and two retailers, the manufacturer directly recovers used products and carry out new manufacturing and remanufacturing of products, and the retailers sell products. Method of game theory is adopted to research the benefits of supply chain in three competition modes and different game modes. The results show when a retailer has moderate decision-making right, the manufacturer and the retailer with the priority of decision-making have the highest optimal benefit, the manufacturer’s recovery effort coefficient is the biggest, and the optimal benefit of the whole supply chain, the consumer surplus and the social welfare are also the biggest, thereby favoring the integral benefit of the supply chain and producing the maximum social benefit.

Key words: Closed-loop supply chain  Remanufacturing  Stackelberg game  Cournot game Benefit

CLC No: F253

国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472033). Received 20070606, received in revised form 20080107

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